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Abstract. This paper presents an agent-based urban land market model. We 
first replace the centralized price determination mechanism of the monocentric 
urban market model with a series of bilateral trades distributed in space and 
time. We then run the model for agents with heterogeneous preferences for lo-
cation. Model output is analyzed using a series of macro-scale economic and 
landscape pattern measures, including land rent gradients estimated using sim-
ple regression. We demonstrate that heterogeneity in preference for proximity 
alone is sufficient to generate urban expansion and that information on agent 
heterogeneity is needed to fully explain land rent variation over space. Our 
agent-based land market model serves as computational laboratory that may 
improve our understanding of the processes generating patterns observed in 
real-world data. 
1 Introduction 
Spatial forms of cities and urban land prices are the results of land allocation between 
competitive users via land markets. Land market models in urban economics, as many 
other economic models, often assume a single representative agent [1, 2]. This paper 
presents an agent-based model of an urban land market in which agents exhibit het-
erogeneous preferences for proximity to the urban centre. We compare macro scale 
economic and spatial measures arising from both homogeneous and heterogeneous 
agents interacting in a land market. We show that by providing the opportunity to 
track characteristics of agents, the spatial goods being exchanged, and associated land 
transaction data, our agent-based land market serves as a computational laboratory for 
exploring micro-macro linkages in urban land markets (particularly, links between in-
dividual preferences, emerging land prices and urban patterns).  
We underline the importance of building from existing theoretical and empirical 
work done in spatial, urban and environmental economics in constructing our ABM of 
land use with an endogenous market mechanism. Many traditional models of urban 
land markets find their roots in the monocentric urban model of W. Alonso [1]. Ac-
cording to his bid-rent theory, households choose locations at a certain distance from 
the central business district (CBD) by maximizing utility from the joint consumption 
of a spatial good (a land lot or house) and a composite good (all other goods) under 
their budget constraint. The outcome of the bid-rent model is a set of rent gradients 
(i.e., land prices at different distances from the CBD). The model predicts that the 
land rent gradient is decreasing with distance and land prices for equidistant locations 
are the same.  
As is typical in economics, certain restrictive assumptions are made to solve for 
equilibrium conditions in traditional urban economics models. In general these restric-
tive economic assumptions can contradict real world phenomena and have raised sub-
stantial criticisms. These assumptions (each of which has a representative example in 
urban economics) fall into four general areas [3]: limitations of the representative 
agent approach [4]; limitations of assumptions of economic rationality [5]; absence of 
direct interactions among agents [6]; and absence of analysis of out-of-equilibrium 
dynamics [5, 7, 8]1. As discussed by many agent-based computational economics 
scholars, ABM may serve as a tool to relax one or several of these assumptions to 
shift to more realistic models. For the purposes of this paper, we introduce heteroge-
neous agents and replace an equilibrium centralized price determination by distributed 
bilateral trading.  
Applications of ABMs to land use (ABM/LUCC) are quite diverse [9]. To date, the 
majority of efforts of the ABM community to integrate markets into ABM/LUCC 
have been focused on agricultural applications [10-12], which differ from urban land 
markets [13]. Several models study the effects of hypothetical urban land markets, but 
with primary emphasis on the demand side. The SOME and SLUCE models allow 
agents to choose the parcel that maximizes their utility without competition from 
other sellers and assuming that the locating agent will outbid the current use [14]. The 
MADCM model provides a welfare analysis of the simulated urban land market [15] 
with the focus on the demand side. Our model moves beyond previous work in sev-
eral aspects. Both the demand and supply sides are represented in detail, facilitating 
model experiments focused on the drivers of each2. The process of locating trading 
partners in space, forming bid and ask prices, and resolving trades is also modelled 
explicitly. The primary aim of this paper is to investigate how aggregated land pat-
terns and rent gradients change in the monocentric urban model if agents with homo-
geneous preferences for proximity are replaced by heterogeneous ones. In the coming 
sections we describe the structure of our model and discuss the simulation results. 
                                                          
1 See [3, 13] for a wider discussion of this criticisms with respect to urban economics 
2 In this particular paper we replicate the monocentric urban model that assumes that sellers are 
agricultural land owners and that their ask price is the same for every cell. However, the code 
of our program integrates the possibility to model the formation of ask prices for households 
and agricultural sellers. 
2 The models 
Our Agent-based Land MArket (ALMA) model explicitly represents micro-scale inter-
actions between buyers and sellers of spatial goods. In line with the assumptions of 
the monocentric model, the ALMA model assumes that sellers (i.e. owners of agricul-
tural land) offer land at the same fixed price equal to agricultural opportunity costs 
and that each spatial good is differentiated by distance from the CBD (or its inverse 
measure – proximity P3), while environmental amenities (A) are assumed to be dis-
tributed uniformly in the city. Buyers (i.e., households) search for a location that 
maximizes their utility βα PAU ⋅=  (α  and β  are individual preferences for green 
amenities and proximity correspondingly and utility, as usual in micro economics, is a 
mathematical representation of preferences) and is affordable under their disposable 
budget for housing net of transport costs (Y). The rationality of agents is bounded by 
the fact that they do not search for the maximum throughout the whole landscape but 
rather search for the local maximum among N randomly chosen cells. We impose this 
assumption since the search for a house in reality is very costly (time-wise and 
money-wise), meaning that a global optimum is not likely to be located in real-world 
housing markets. After defining the spatial good that gives maximum utility, a buyer 
forms the bid price. A bid price is a function of utility (U), individual income (Y) and 





⋅=  (1) 
Then buyers submit their offer-bids to the sellers. Sellers choose the highest bid-
offer and if it is above their ask price, then transactions take place. If not then both 
buyer and seller participate in the land market in the next time step. The final transac-
tion price is an arithmetic average of the ask price and the highest bid price. Figure 1 
shows the logic of the trading mechanism, i.e. one time step in the model5. The model 
stops running when no more transactions occur, i.e. all the submitted bids are lower 
than ask prices.  
 
                                                          
3 Proximity is defined as P=Dmax+1-D, where D is distance of a cell to the CBD 
4 The justification and properties of this demand function are discussed in details in [3] 
5 For extended description of the event sequencing see [3] 
 
Fig. 1. Conceptual algorithm of trade 
Of course buyers and sellers are not the only agents participating in a land market. 
Urban developers and real estate agents influence both spatial patterns and land price 
formation. We discuss their roles and ways to integrate them in the ALMA model 
elsewhere [3, 16]. In this paper we keep the model as simple as possible to give an 
analysis of the effects of agents’ preferences heterogeneity on the urban pattern and 
land prices. 
3 Simulation Experiments 
The model simulations produce spatially explicit rent gradients and land patterns. Ex-
periments varying different parameters such as transport costs, bidding strategy, the 
level of environmental amenities and others have been  performed with the model [3, 
13]. In this paper we investigate how changes in buyers’ and sellers’ preferences, par-
ticularly a shift from homogeneous to heterogeneous preferences for proximity to the 
urban centre, affect economic indicators and the spatial morphology of the city. In ad-
dition to graphical representations, we also present a set of metrics to analyze micro 
and macro economic and spatial outcomes, including welfare measures, economic and 
spatial indicators, and estimated land rent gradients6. 
All the model experiments presented in this paper were performed on a 29x29 grid 
of cells. The total number of sellers was set equal to 841 and the number of buyers 
                                                          
6An equation that quantitatively characterizes the transaction price at a given distance from the 
city centre, estimated using linear regression analysis. The land gradient is a typical characteris-
tic of urban spatial structure analyzed both theoretically and empirically [2] 
was equal to 1000. The ALMA parameters for all model experiments are listed in Ta-
ble 1; the only parameter that was varied between the 2 experiments is the agent’s 
preference for proximity. The comparison of the outcomes in terms of macro and mi-
cro economic and spatial measures is presented in Tables 3 and 4. 
Table 1. Values of parameters in the simulation experiments 
Symbol Meaning Exp 1 Exp 2 
Y Individual budget 800 800 
A Level of green amenities 1 1 
b Constant in (1) 70 70 
Ncells Number of spatial goods (lots) in the city 841 841 
Pask Ask price of a seller of agricultural land 250 250 
TCU Transport costs per unit of distance 1 1 
β Individual preference for the proximity to 
the CBD 
0.85 uniform distribution 
[0.7;1] 
--- Mean preference in the traders population 0.85 0.85 
 
 
Multiple experiments runs with different random seeds were performed. A differ-
ent random seed affects both the distribution of preferences and the order of activation 
of agents. Difference in the morphology of a city and economic indices are small. Fu-
ture work will derive formal bounds for these realized output metrics. Below we pre-
sent results and provide a discussion of two typical simulations different in the set-
tings as described in Table 1. 
Table 2. Economic and spatial metric outcomes of the ALMA experiments 
Parameter Exp 1 Exp 2 
Individual utility:                          Mean 65.48 65.71 
St. dev. 12.58 13.22 
Aggregate utility 30 448.82 33 312.31 
Buyers’ bid price:                         Mean 363.72 364.28 
St. dev. 74 77.54 
Urban transaction price:               Mean 306.86 307.14 
St. dev. 37 38.77 
Average surplus:                          Buyers’ 56.86 57.14 
Sellers’  56.86 57.14 
Total property value 142 690.16 155 721.10 
City size (urban population) 465 507 








Table 3. Linear regression estimates of rent gradient functions (Dependent variable is the 
transaction price) 
Exp 2 (1 and 2) 
Parameter Exp 1 1 independent 
variable (D) 
2 independent vari-
ables (D and β) 
Number of observations 465 507 507 
R: 0.9905 0.9560 0.9832 
Intercept:                                          estimate 410.76 414.16 482.32 
St error 0.501 1.084 2.477 
t-Value 819.68 381.99 194.71 
Distance to CBD:                             estimate -12.81 -12.64 -11.98 
St error 0.058 0.121 0.078 
t-Value -219.94 -104.70 -153.32 
Buyers’ preference for proximity:   estimate -- -- -93.50 
St error -- -- 3.271 
t-Value -- -- -28.58 
3.1 Experiment 1 
We begin with an experiment that replicates the benchmark case of a monocentric 
Alonso model with homogeneous agents (also presented in [3]). The main difference 
between the simulation experiment and the analytical model is that the centralized 
land price determination mechanism is replaced by a series of spatially distributed bi-
lateral trades. The results are presented in Table 2. The spatial form of the city and 
urban land rent gradient are presented in Figures 2a and 2b respectively. 
  
a: Spatial form of a city b: Land rent gradient 
Fig. 2. Exp 1, Replication of the Alonso model (with homogeneous preferences for commuting) 
The green area in Figure 2a represents agriculture and the black–the urban area. 
The intensity of grey colour in Figure 2b symbolizes the value of land: the darker the 
colour, the higher the land price. As in the benchmark case of a theoretical monocen-
tric urban model, the land rent gradient is decreasing with distance. The urban land 
price is equal for cells equidistant from the CBD. The city expansion stops at the loca-
tion where the bid price of a buyer falls below the agricultural rent. The lightest-grey 
area in Figure 2b shows the beginning of agricultural area (urban-rural fringe) and 
symbolizes the city border. Note that not all of the buyers in the system ultimately 
purchase properties (only 465 of the 841 buyers engage in transactions). The parame-
ter settings for Exp 1, then, replicate an open city model, where buyers are assumed to 
have the opportunity to purchase property in another location, if their bid price for 
available properties in this region is below the sellers’ ask prices of the current land 
owners.  
By applying a simple regression analysis to the model-generated data we estimated 
a land-price gradient7 (Table 3 and Figure 3). Figure 3 shows a down-slopping de-
mand function for land in the simulated urban zone. The horizontal axis shows the 
distance from the CBD in spatial units (a spatial unit can be interpreted as 1 km or 1 
mile, although in our generalized analysis we do not refer to any specific unit here). 
The vertical axis shows the urban land price in monetary units (such as dollars or 
euro).  
 
Fig. 3. Land rent gradients for Exp 1, linear regression fit of the model-generated data. TransPr 
– actual land transaction prices, Fitted value – estimated land rent gradient 
3.2 Experiment 2 
The setup in this experiment is almost that same as in Exp 1 (see Table 1) except for 
the fact that agents are heterogeneous with respect to preference for proximity . We 
assume that agents have different tolerance for commuting, i.e. β from the utility 
function follows uniform distribution in the range [0.7; 1] with mean equal to 0.858. 
Analytical calculation of an equilibrium land price is possible only with homogeneous 
preferences.  
                                                          
7 The results of linear regression model showed the best fit. The R2 values for linear, log-log, 
semi-log and inverse semi-log functional forms were 0.9923, 0.8166, 0.9738 and 0.8647 re-
spectively. 
8 We also run the model with the normal distribution of preferences but the results are not pre-
sented in this paper because of the paper length limitations. 
The first difference from Exp 1 manifests itself in the spatial morphology of the 
city as can be seen from comparison of Figures 2a and 4a. The city border has ex-
panded a bit and urban population has increased (from 465 to 507) as can be seen in 
Table 2. Thus, if agents have different tolerance levels for commuting and are not 
constrained by the remoteness of the location (e.g., use private cars instead of public 
transport) then this is already enough to cause the urban area to sprawl even if green 
amenities are distributed homogeneously across the city. Essentially, heterogeneity in 
individual preferences for proximity may be a contributor to urban sprawl.  
Additionally, the city no longer expands uniformly in all directions (compare the 
south, north, west and east borders of the city on Figure 4a). Since people have differ-
ent preferences for proximity, there are just a few individuals tolerant enough to 
commuting to locate at the most distant edges of the city, such as a person in the north 
of the city (Figure 4a).  
  
a: Spatial form of a city b: Land rent gradient 
Fig. 4. Exp 2, Monocentric urban model with heterogeneous agents (with respect to commuting 
preferences) 
The land price gradient (Figure 4b) is decreasing with distance as in Exp 1 (Figure 
2b). However, in Exp 2 the prices of the cells at the same distance from the CBD are 
no longer equal because of preference heterogeneity. Thus, neither the spatial form 
nor land prices are symmetric in the city with heterogeneous agents. The average bid 
price is slightly higher in the city with heterogeneous preferences for proximity to 
CBD than in the homogeneous case; the total property value is about 9% higher in 
Exp 2 than in Exp 1 (see Table 2). On the one hand, agents with higher than average 
preferences for proximity, i.e. β>0.85, bid more for the urban land that is closer to the 
CBD than an average agent, i.e. β=0.85 as in Exp 1. On the other hand, agents with 
lower than average preferences for proximity , i.e. β<0.85, bid more for the remote 
spatial good than an average agent from Exp 1 would do, because the former are more 
tolerant to commuting. In Exp 2 the average β of the agents who actually settled in the 
city is 0.79, meaning that agents more tolerant to commuting out bid agents with 
strong preferences for proximity to CBD. 
The estimated land rent gradient of the computer-generated data from Exp 2 is pre-
sented in Figure 5 and in Table 3. From Figure 3 it can be seen that transaction data 
are almost on the regression line. In contrast, data on transaction land price from Exp 
2 is more dispersed, but is still down sloping as in the Alonso bid rent theory.  The 
dispersion (essentially, distance-dependent heteroskedasticity) arises from the prefer-
ence heterogeneity.  Standard econometric theory also tells us that this rent gradient 
estimate is biased due to the omitted variable of preference heterogeneity. This simple 
modelling exercise illustrates that observed variation in real-world transaction prices 
may arise from non-spatially-uniformly distributed unobserved agent-level character-
istics rather than from unbiased random error. Thus, rent gradient estimates that do 
not control for agent-level heterogeneity are likely to be systematically biased. 
 
Fig. 5. Land rent gradients for Exp 2-1.  linear regression fit of the computer generated data. 
TransPr – actual land transaction prices, Fitted value – estimated land rent gradient 
The explained variation (R2) from Exp 1 is higher in Exp 1 than Exp 2-1 (0.9905 
vs. 0.9560, Table 3). The settings for Exp 1 are very abstract, especially in its assump-
tion of homogeneous preferences for location. If everybody in the city behaves as a 
representative agent does then land prices can be fully explained only by the charac-
teristics of the spatial environment, such as distance.  In practice, this is the only in-
formation usually available for hedonic price estimation. However, in reality agents 
preferences for the spatial good vary.  Therefore, the percent of variation of the land 
price explained by land characteristics only decreases. The ABM environment allows 
us to link information about agents’ preferences to transaction data and analyze it in 
the regression analyses. We re-ran the regression model using data from Exp 2, in-
cluding agents’ preferences for proximity as a second independent variable (see Table 
3, column 4). As expected, the explained variation in land price increases (i.e. R2 is 
0.9832 instead of 0.9560). Further, the estimated coefficient on distance to CBD de-
clines in absolute value from 12.64 to 11.98, indicating that the first model overesti-
mated the influence of transportation costs on hedonic land values.   
Certainly, data about individual preferences is not easily acquired. Usually this re-
quires a survey or role-playing games. Such micro level data can be used to construct 
empirical ABMs. ABMs fed with empirical data at the micro decision level [14, 17] 
provide nice examples of analysis of both the spatial and agent-level drivers of  land-
use change. Thus, an ABM land market supported by micro-level data on preferences 
for location can serve as a computational laboratory in which we have a full under-
standing of the agent-level and spatial factors that influence bid prices, ask prices, 
and realized transactions. 
4 Conclusions and discussions 
In this paper, we have presented an agent-based land market model and analyzed the 
macro outcomes of simulations for the case of homogeneous and heterogeneous 
agents’ preferences. In our ABM market, there is no one unique equilibrium-
determined price for everyone in the market; rather, there is a set of individual trans-
action prices determined via bilateral trading by each set of trading partners sepa-
rately. In spite of the fact that the centralized price determination mechanism is re-
placed by the distributed bilateral trading, the ALMA model with homogeneous 
agents reproduces the qualitative results of a monocentric urban model.  
In the case of heterogeneous individual preferences for proximity, the land price 
gradients no longer exactly follow the predictions of the analytical model. In particu-
lar, the land price still generally decreases with distance to the city centre, but the 
prices of the equidistant cells are no longer equal since individuals with heterogene-
ous tolerance for commuting value them differently.  
The most interesting result is that the city border has expanded due solely to the in-
troduction of heterogeneity in agents’ preferences for proximity. Essentially, the ex-
isting of the agents who are more tolerant for commuting creates a ground for urban 
sprawl. Thus, heterogeneity among individual location preferences is likely to be one 
of the factors causing urban sprawl. To our knowledge this result has not been re-
ported before. Empirical econometric modelling [18, 19] has demonstrated the rela-
tionship between urban sprawl and landscape heterogeneity (green amenities). Agent-
based urban models demonstrate that  heterogeneous agents and heterogeneous land-
scape in combination exacerbate urban sprawl [14]. However, the fact that heteroge-
neity in preferences per se causes city expansion and spatially heterogeneous land rent 
patterns is a new result that could be demonstrated only through the agent-based land 
market, since the standard urban economic models cannot be solved with heterogene-
ous preferences.  
The introduction of preference for open-space amenities and/or aversion to urban 
density has been shown to produce discontinuous patterns of development [14, 20-
22]. We expect similar results with the ALMA model when open-space amenities are 
introduced.  We also expect that the combination of heterogeneity of preferences for 
proximity and a heterogeneous landscape will exacerbate urban expansion and sprawl, 
especially if the distribution of open-space amenities is modelled in a realistic way. 
Usually, the level of environmental amenities increases with distance from the CBD. 
So, those people who are already tolerant for commuting receive additional benefits 
of settling farther from the city centre.  These households are willing to pay more for 
a remote location if it has a scenic view or a park close by, so more open space is 
converted into urban use and the city expands further. We leave these experiments for 
future work. 
With the help of a simple regression analysis of the model-generated data, we 
demonstrated that the data on individual preferences (available in the case of ABM) 
increases the explained variation in land prices. Essentially, we have created a compu-
tational laboratory in which we have a full understanding of the agent-level and spa-
tial factors that influence bid prices, ask prices, and realized transactions. This labora-
tory lets us explore the statistical predictions that emerge from these models, creating 
an opportunity for greater understanding of the potential processes that have gener-
ated the transaction data that we observe in the real world. 
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